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I. INTRODUCTION
In their haste to stem the hemorrhaging of economic losses
attributable to the problem of international copyright infringe-
ment, United States policy-makers have overlooked the problem
of recognition and enforcement of foreign copyright judgments
and arbitration awards imposed by the United States Constitu-
tion. In particular, the first amendment's guarantees of free-
dom of speech and press, undeniably have a direct impact on
copyright law in the United States. Although there are no re-
ported cases where a United States court has refused to recog-
nize and enforce a foreign copyright judgment or arbitration
award because of first amendment implications, recent United
States court decisions have refused to enforce English libel
judgments on the grounds that English libel laws were repug-
nant to the first amendment. Certainly, many foreign copyright
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laws would not pass a similar first amendment analysis. If the
same rationale were to be used in an action involving the en-
forcement of a foreign copyright judgment or arbitration award
in the United States it is possible that enforcement would be
denied. Yet these constitutional implications seem to have gone
unnoticed.
It is not altogether surprising that these constitutional
problems have been given little attention. International copy-
right infringement costs United States businesses billions of
dollars each year. With the inclusion of copyright protection for
computer programs and the advent of the Internet, the interna-
tional business implications are immense. It would be difficult
to argue that the same economic incentives are involved with
libel laws. Yet, these economic and international incentives do
not justify this lack of attention given to constitutional
problems. Indeed, with so much attention focused on interna-
tional conventions, treaties and accords dealing with intellec-
tual property issues, it is imperative that we address potential
constitutional problems especially in the area of enforcement.
Two of the most important international agreements in the
field of international copyright law are the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne")' and
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")2-Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"). 3
These two international agreements were implemented to pro-
vide a uniform mechanism for the international protection of
copyrighted works, but they do little to assist in the recognition
and enforcement of a foreign copyright judgment or arbitration
award. Protection may be meaningless without a mechanism of
enforcement. Inevitably, it is only a matter of time before this
omission is addressed. Thus, the question this article is di-
rected to is what happens if the holder of a foreign copyright
1 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971) [hereinaf-
ter Berne] .
2 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.
188 [hereinafter GATT].
3 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, § 33i.L.M. 11-7 (4 [hcre-offr TR IPsi.
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judgment or arbitration award seeks recognition and enforce-
ment in the United States? Will they be denied recourse due to
the first amendment?
Although this problem is real, it is not insurmountable. 4
This article addresses the problem by posing a hypothetical
copyright problem applying the copyright laws of the United
Kingdom. It will be necessary to compare copyright laws of the
United States and the United Kingdom and to examine the
rights of free speech and press in the United States and the
United Kingdom. Next, we shall examine the decisions by
courts in the United States in cases refusing to enforce English
libel judgments on first amendment grounds. It will be shown
that the decisions by these courts are erroneous. This misappli-
cation of the first amendment can be corrected by higher courts
in the United States than those that rendered the opinions re-
fusing to recognize and enforce English libel judgments. Given
the international and economic implications, it is likely that
courts in the United States will, either correct this misapplica-
tion, reinterpret the first amendment or simply ignore the prob-
lem in order to allow recognition and enforcement of foreign
copyright judgments and arbitration awards. Finally, we shall
examine Berne and GATT/TRIPS to illustrate why these agree-
ments do not alleviate the problem of recognition and
enforcement.
II. THE PROBLEM
Defendant copied information from plaintiffs directory of
solicitors and barristers to compile his own directory. The infor-
mation taken included names, addresses and telephone num-
bers. As with plaintiffs directory, defendant's directory
compiled the information in alphabetical order. There is no
question that information was copied, although the information
could have been obtained by other sources.
Plaintiff is a Canadian living in the United Kingdom and
the defendant is an American living in the United Kingdom.
4 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 150 (Henry Reeve
trans. & Francis Bowen ed., Harper Row 1966)(1835). The author observed: "I
have never been more struck by the good sense and the practical judgement of the
Americans than in the manner in which they elude the numberless difficulties re-
sulting from their Federal Constitution." Id.
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The subject work's place of origin is Canada. The alleged in-
fringement occurs in the United Kingdom and an action is filed
in the United Kingdom. Plaintiff obtains judgment. But, alas,
defendant has no money in the United Kingdom so plaintiff at-
tempts to enforce her judgment in the United States where de-
fendant has most of his assets.
The copyright law of the United Kingdom would apply in
the underlying action. The plaintiff is a foreign (Canadian) au-
thor so Berne would require national treatment and the appli-
cation of lex loci protectionis. The problem for our copyright
plaintiff is a problem of recognition and enforcement in the
United States of a United Kingdom copyright judgment. The
copyright laws of the United Kingdom are fundamentally differ-
ent from those of the United States in the application of the
idea/expression-fact/expression dichotomy and the fair use doc-
trine and these differences have first amendment implications.
Should a court in the United States in an action to recog-
nize and enforce a foreign copyright judgment or arbitration
award apply the first amendment to a situation where all the
relevant acts took place outside of the United States?
III. DOMESTIC FRAMEWORK REGARDING COPYRIGHT LAW,
FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS
Before we can determine if there is a real first amendment
problem in recognizing and enforcing United Kingdom copy-
right judgments and arbitration awards, we need to compare
the copyright laws of the United States and the United King-
dom and analyze how they coalesce with free speech and press
concerns. While laws in the United States and the United
Kingdom share a common heritage, they are historically and po-
litically different in many fundamental respects. Nowhere is
this more apparent than in the fact that certain laws in the
United States, such as copyright law, are based upon and lim-
ited by a written constitution whereas laws in the United King-
dom are free from the limitations set down by a written
constitution. This section addresses some of the historical and
legal differences between United States and United Kingdom
copyright laws and examines free speech and press rights in the
TT_-4-.a SQ-- nd Ilnited Kingdom.
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A. United States Copyright Law
Copyright law in the United States is based upon the
United States Constitution. Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the
United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
"The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries. .. "
Without a doubt, the drafters of the United States Consti-
tution were familiar with copyright law in Great Britain.5 Fur-
ther, the inclusion of this provision in the United States
Constitution does not appear to have caused a great deal of con-
troversy at the time that the Constitution was drafted, debated
and ratified. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, an apologia and analysis
of the United States Constitution written in an attempt to gar-
ner support for the Constitution,6 dedicates little attention to
the copyright provision of the Constitution. The pertinent part
may be found in THE FEDERALIST, No. 43, which addresses the
powers granted to Congress and states:
1. A power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts
by securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries." 7
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain
to be a right of common law.
The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to be-
long to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases
with the claims of individuals.
The States cannot separately make effectual provision for
either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision
of this point by laws passed at the instance of Congress.8
There is no further discussion about the copyright provision of
the United States Constitution in this great apologia. A ra-
5 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, 48 (1970).
6 See Clinton Rossiter, INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, vii-iX
(1961)(1788).
7 JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST, Number 43 (1788).
8 Id. at 271-72.
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tional conclusion to be drawn from their near silence on this
issue is that they did not deem it necessary to defend the copy-
right clause.
On May 31, 1790, under the authority of the copyright pro-
vision in the United States Constitution, Congress enacted the
first copyright law in the United States.9 To keep up with the
ever-changing developments of technology, Congress has
amended the copyright law on several occasions. 10 Yet, despite
these amendments to the United States copyright law, Con-
gress' design to protect authors by creating a property right in
their works remains intact.1" It is believed that by creating this
property right and granting to authors limited legal monopolies
in their works1 2 the primary goal of United States copyright
law, namely the promotion of creativity and the dissemination
of creative works, will be achieved.' 3 These legal monopolies
granted to authors are limited not only in duration,1 4 but also in
scope in that the original expressions of authors are protected
but ideas and facts are not. 15
1. The Idea/Expression-Fact /Expression Dichotomy
Under the idea/expression-fact/expression dichotomy,
United States copyright protection extends only to an author's
9 See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1182, n. 7 (1970).
10 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, et. seq. For example, the 1976 and 1980 amendments
relating to protection of computer programs; the 1988 amendment relating to the
United States becoming a member of the Berne Convention; the 1990 amendment
relating to the visual arts; and the 1992 amendment relating to registration.
11 See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv.
L. REV. 1659, 1662 (1987); W. Warren Hamel, Harper & Row v. The Nation: A First
Amendment Privilege for News Reporting of Copyright Material? 19 COLUM. J. L.
& Soc. PROBS., 253, 255 (1985).
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. See also J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the
Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2431, 2434 (1994).
13 See Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copy-
right, 47 U. MiAI L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1993); 3 STORY, supra note 5, at 49. See also
Deborah A. Hartnett, A New Era for Copyright Law: Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 39 COPYRIGHT LAw SYMPOSIUM 167 (1992).
14 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305.
15 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See also MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER,
1NMM k 0, G -....! 4, §S 1A I -16.08 (1996).
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expression, not to facts or ideas.16 Consequently, the "market
place of ideas" protected by the first amendment is not compro-
mised by copyright law17 as facts and ideas may be freely dis-
seminated without fear of copyright infringement. One problem
with the dichotomy is that courts have difficulties in discerning
where an expression ends and an idea or fact begins.18 A fur-
ther problem arises when the idea or fact can only be expressed
in a limited fashion or when the fact(s) or idea(s) become so en-
twined with the expression as to become inseparable. In such
cases, courts may invoke the merger doctrine and no copyright
protection is available.' 9
Courts have had to contort the dichotomy at times in order
to protect first amendment concerns. For example, in the case
of Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 20 which involved the ques-
tion of copyright protection for Mr. Zapruder's home movie that
captured President Kennedy's assassination, the court ignored
the problem of the idea and expression being so interwoven as
to be inseparable. 2 ' Rather than address this problem and the
possible application of the merger doctrine, the court presumed
expression and applied the fair use doctrine.22 While this
course of action may have avoided a head on collision between
the first amendment and copyright law, it contorts the idea/ex-
pression-fact/expression dichotomy.
16 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See also Tiffany D. Trunko, Remedies for Copyright
Infringement: Respecting the First Amendment, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1940, 1948
(1989).
17 See Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 292 (1979). See, e.g., Sid
& Marty Kroft v. McDonalds, 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
18 See Trunko, supra note 16, at 1952. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House,
Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987)(where the court
appears to have difficulty in discerning the difference between an idea and an
expression).
19 See Denicola, supra note 17, at 292-93. See, e.g., Hebert Rosenthal Jewelry
Co. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971); Morrisey v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
20 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
21 See NIMMER, supra note 9, at 1197-99.
22 See id.
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2. The Fair Use Doctrine
Courts in the United States have relied on English cases in
developing the fair use doctrine. 23 It has been defined as:
"[a] privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use
the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his con-
sent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the
copyright."24
The fair use doctrine is applied only after there has been a
determination that there is some expression warranting protec-
tion.25 If the work contains no expression and is only ideas and/
or facts, there is no protection and no need to do a fair use anal-
ysis.26 Under the fair use doctrine, a defendant otherwise liable
for infringement has a statutory defense excusing liability if
four factors weigh in his or her favor:
1. The purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
2. The nature of the copyrighted work;
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.27
As with the idea/expression-fact/expression dichotomy,
courts, at times, contort the fair use doctrine when a copyright
injunction presents prior restraint, first amendment concerns. 28
For example, although the first factor in the fair use doctrine
requires the court to consider whether or not the nature of the
23 See Hartnett, supra note 13, at 168, n. 3.
24 HORACE BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944).
25 See Fisher, supra note 11, at 1686. See also Hamel, supra note 11, at 259;
17 U.S.C. § 107.
26 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. See also NIMMER, supra note 9, at 1200-01.
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. The legislative history for this statutory provision in-
dicates that these four factors are merely illustrative. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5659,
5776.
28 See Trunko, supra note 16, at 1951. See also Denicola, supra note 17, at
294-95; Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2nd Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Keep Thomas Governor Comm. v. Citi-
zeum l Ri .... 3mm., 157 F ,11nn. 957 (D.N.H. 1978).
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use is commercial, 29 some courts have disregarded or given lit-
tle weight to this factor arguably to protect first amendment in-
terests. 30 This creates a problem as the United States Supreme
Court has held that commercial speech is protected by the first
amendment, albeit with less vigor than political speech. 31
In applying the fourth factor of the fair use doctrine, courts
have balanced plaintiffs economic interests against the free
flow of information to the public encouraged by the fair use doc-
trine and the first amendment. 32 The problem with such a bal-
ancing test is that it risks reducing first amendment guarantees
by subordinating them to economic interests.33
3. There is no Separate and Distinct First Amendment
Defense to Copyright Infringement
Some commentators have argued that the idea/expres-
sion-fact/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrine are insuffi-
cient to cover all first amendment concerns 34 because they
leave open the possibility that certain expressions of tremen-
dous public importance may not be disseminated. 35 By way of
example, Nimmer cites the case of Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Assoc.,36 as well as the pictures from the My Lai massacre.3 7 In
each of these examples, the ideas and/or facts were so entwined
with the expression that it was impossible to separate one from
29 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that commercial use is presump-
tively unfair. See, e.g., Sony Corp v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449
(1984).
30 See Janice E. Oakes, Copyright and the First Amendment: Where Lies the
Public Interest, 59 TuL. L. REV. 135, 145 (1984-85). See also Consumer Union of
United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983);
Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 306.
31 See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
32 See New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217
(D.C.N.J. 1977); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
33 See Denicola, supra note 17, at 303, 309.
34 See id. at 309. For an argument that fair use and the idea-expression di-
chotomy are sufficient see Oakes, supra note 30, at 136-41; Pamela Samuelson,
Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and
Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836, 879 (1982).
35 See Denicola, supra note 17, at 309.
36 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
37 See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1197-99.
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the other. The doctrine of merger could have been but was not
applied.
However, it is not within the scope of this paper to examine
whether a separate first amendment defense is needed. Rather,
we shall accept the general consensus that there are first
amendment implications in United States copyright law and ex-
plore the issue of whether this creates a problem in the context
of recognition and enforcement of foreign copyright judgments
and arbitration awards.
B. United Kingdom Copyright Law
Copyright law in the United Kingdom has a rather check-
ered history. It began as laws enacted to encourage the printing
of books. 38 Then it developed into laws enacted to restrict and
censure printing and to protect the interests of publishers.39 Fi-
nally, it evolved into laws designed to encourage the dissemina-
tion of information and protect authors.40
Copyright law in the United Kingdom has been traced back
to the fifteenth century with the advent of printing.41 In Eng-
land, under King Richard III, a statute was passed encouraging
the printing of books and allowing them to be imported. 42 How-
ever, this law was repealed fifty years later on protectionist
grounds. 43
In 1556, the original Charter of Stationers' Company was
passed. 44 This was supported by publishers, not authors, as a
means of trying to protect their financial interest.45 It was also
supported by the Crown whose object was to prevent the propa-
gation of the new Protestant religion by restricting the press.46
The institution given the authority to regulate the manner of
38 See Michael L. Crowley, A First Amendment Exception to Copyright for Exi-
gent Circumstances, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 437, 439-42 (1985); Paul Goldstein, Copy-
right and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 989 (1970); E.P. SKONE
JAMES, ET AL., COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT, 7-11 (1980).
39 See id.
40 See W.R. Cornish, The International Relations of Intellectual Property, CAM-
BRIDGE L. J., 46, 46-50 (1993).
41 See JAMES, supra note 38, at 7.
42 See 1 Ric. 3, c. 9 (1483).
43 See 25 Hen. 8, c.15.
44 See JAMES, supra note 38, at 7-8.
45 See id.
46 .. ;d
11
PACE INT'L L. REV.
printing, the number of presses and enforcing the prohibition of
printing materials that opposed statutes or the law of the realm
was the infamous Star Chamber. 47 The Star Chamber was
abolished in 1640.48
From 1640 to 1695, in order to print a book one had to ob-
tain a license. 49 This not only prevented the printing of materi-
als believed by the Crown and Parliament to be undesirable it
also created a proprietary right for the publisher of the book
giving the publisher the sole printing rights.50
In 1709, the first copyright act was passed.51 This act gave
authors of books the sole right and liberty of printing their
books.52 Up to this point in time copyright law, arguably, was
more of a tool of the Crown to suppress free speech and press
rather than encourage it. The 1709 Act was not amended until
1814.53 The act has been subsequently amended on numerous
occasions. The current copyright act is the 1988 Act.5 4
1. Idea/Expression-Fact/Expression Dichotomy
Unlike United States copyright law, statutory copyright
law in the United Kingdom does not state that ideas are not
protected.55 Although copyright law in the United Kingdom ac-
knowledges that, at some level, there is no copyright protection
in ideas, the legal premise behind this proposition, and hence
the legal analysis, is fundamentally different from United
States copyright law. For example, it has been said:
There is no copyright in an idea as such, for it is neither a
literary, dramatic or musical work. Unfortunately, this simple
proposition has frequently been stated in a more extreme form,
that there is no copyright in ideas or information but only in the
form in which they are expressed. Like all pithy catch phrase,
this is liable to lead to confusion. It is sometimes used to mean
47 See id. at 7.
48 See id. at 8.
49 See JAMES, supra note 38, at 10.
50 See id.
51 See 8 Anne, c.19. See also JAMES, supra note 38 at 11.
52 See JAMES, supra note 38, at 11.
53 See id. at 12.
54 United Kingdom Copyright Act of 1988.
55 See HUGH LADDIE, ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGN 61
(2d ed. 1995).
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that copyright law protects form-language, for instance-but
never substantive content. We propose to show that this asser-
tion cannot withstand serious critical analysis. 56
It is perhaps more accurate to say that in the United King-
dom, copyright law does not protect general ideas, only detailed
ideas. 57 The more detailed the expression of facts or ideas, the
more likely protection will be afforded.58
Because the 1988 Act does not specify that ideas are not
protected, arguably courts should not apply an idea/expression
dichotomy test.59 What is to be afforded protection under the
1988 Act is an original work.60 Accordingly, courts in the
United Kingdom should examine whether general facts and
ideas were copied and if the infringing work so closely resem-
bles the plaintiffs work in structure and pattern as to lead one
to the conclusion that it infringes. 61
With regard to the protection of facts, copyright law in the
United Kingdom is more liberal in allowing protection for the
compilation of facts than United States copyright law. Indeed,
it has been said that the law in the United Kingdom regarding
the protection of facts is different from United States copyright
law.
6 2
2. Fair Dealing
In the United Kingdom, there is an exception to copyright
protection under the doctrine of fair dealing,63 which is similar
56 See id. at 61.
57 See id. at 64. See also Ibcos Computers Ltd v. Barclays Mercantile High-
land Finance, Ltd. [1994] F.S.R. 275.
58 See id. at 64-65. References have been made in some cases from the United
Kingdom (for example, John Richardson Computers Ltd v. Flanders [1993] F.S.R.
497, Ferris J.) to the American case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119 (2nd Cir. 1930) for the proposition that, in cases where one is not talking about
literal copying, it is difficult to separate the ideas from the expression; but the
more general the statement the more likely it is an idea. However, the Nichols
case does not stand for the proposition that specific ideas are protected under copy-
right law in the United States. See id. What it does stand for is the proposition
that non-literal structures in literary works may be afforded copyright protection.
See id.
59 See LADDIE, supra note 55, at 64.
60 See Copyright Act, supra note 54, § 1.
61 See LADDIE, supra note 55, at 65.
62 See id. at 56-57.
62 Qee TTnitpd Kingdom Copyright Act of 1988, at §§ 29, 30.
13
PACE INT'L L. REV.
to the United States doctrine of fair use.64 Like fair use, fair
dealing allows the use of copyrighted works for research 65 or
private study. Similarly, fair dealing considers such factors as
the purpose and character of the copyrighted work, the amount
and substantiality of the portion used66 and market effects such
as whether the work in question is commercially competing.67
However, the fair dealing exception only applies to literary, dra-
matic, musical and artistic works and not to film, sound record-
ings, broadcasts or cable programs. 68 This is fundamentally
different from United States copyright law.69
C. Free Speech and Press in the United States
As with copyright law, the fundamental rights of free
speech and press in the United States are based upon the
United States Constitution. 70 Free speech and press protection
can be found in the first amendment, which provides in perti-
nent part:
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ,,71
The first amendment is not merely an assertion of idealized
values of the American society to be ignored when it is politi-
cally, economically, or otherwise expedient to do so. As with
other provisions of the United States Constitution, it sets limits
upon the government. Any acts beyond those limits are void.72
64 See LADDIE, supra note 55, at 132. See also United Kingdom Copyright Act
of 1988, at § 2.155.
65 Some do not take kindly to this aspect of the copyright exception of fair
dealing. Wilson Mizner (1876-1933) is reputed to have said: "When you steal from
one author, it's plagiarism; if you steal from many, it's research." JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 757 (15th ed. 1980).
66 See LADDIE, supra note 55, at 134.
67 See Associated Newspapers Group v. New Group Newspapers, Ltd. [1986]
R.P.C. 515.
68 See LADDIE, supra note 55, at 132. See also United Kingdom Copyright Act
of 1988, at §§ 29, 30; GILLIAN DAVIES, IIC STUDIES, STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL PROP-
ERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAw 39 (Max Plank Institute for Foreign and International
Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich) (1994).
69 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
70 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71 Id.
72 See ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, 6-7
(1967). See also Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1182 and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1957).
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To insure that the government does not act beyond its constitu-
tionally limited powers, the United States judiciary is invested
with the power and the duty to strike down, as void, acts of the
government that are unconstitutional. 7
3
The first amendment not only protects ones right to speak,
it also protects the right to hear.74 The dissemination of truths,
ideas, facts and information encouraged by first amendment
principles has been allegorized as creating a "marketplace of
ideas." Thus, it has been said that it is the corollary to the right
to disseminate truths, ideas, facts and information that there is
an audience to receive those words. 75 The notion of the "mar-
ketplace of ideas," which has been inextricably tied to the first
amendment, presumes that there is not only a seller in the
"marketplace of ideas," but also a buyer.76
Finally, the first amendment also protects one's right to re-
frain from speaking, i.e. privacy rights.77 This right to remain
silent is not as apparent in the historical background to the first
amendment, but it is a logical extrapolation as it seems rather
incredible that the first amendment would allow the govern-
ment to force people to speak.
The language of the first amendment is phrased in absolute
terms. However, it has been held that the first amendment can-
not be read as an absolute prohibition against any governmen-
tal acts that inhibit speech or the press. 78 Most commentators
agree with this interpretation on the basis that to hold other-
wise would be to venture into the absurd. 79 As one commenta-
tor eloquently stated:
"That this amendment was intended to secure every citizen
an absolute right to speak, or write, or print, whatever he might
73 See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 (1788).
74 See Crowley, supra note 38, at 439-42; Hartnett, supra note 13, at 199;
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982); Goldstein, supra note 38, at 989.
75 See ALEXANDER MEIKEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, 26-28 (1965).
76 See Board of Educ., 457 U.S. at 867 (Brennan, J.).
77 See Trunko, supra note 16, at 1957-58. For an example of an attempt to use
copyright to protect privacy interests see Estate of Hemmingway v. Random
House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250 (1968).
78 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Konigsberg v. State Bar,
366 U.S. 36 (1961).
79 See STORY, supra note 5, at 731-38; CHAFEE, supra note 72, at 8; Nimmer,
6 •' -- t - 9^ a t- 118Pq
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please, without any responsibility, public or private, therefor, is a
supposition too wild to be indulged by any rational man."80
Even those who were contemporaries of the authors of the
United States Constitution did not view free speech and press
in absolute terms. For example, the Alien and Sedition Acts of
179881 unquestionably limited speech, perhaps unconstitution-
ally, yet were implemented by a Congress composed of contem-
poraries of the original authors of the Constitution.8 2
Inevitably, if we are to accept the proposition that the first
amendment is not absolute, we must ask the question: What
governmental limitations on the freedom of speech and press
are constitutional? As with many legal questions there is no
bright line test to apply. The facts of each case must be ex-
amined individually by the courts and the governmental inter-
ests of order, safety and protection are weighed against the
interests of free speech and press,8 3 "but freedom of speech [and
press] ought to weigh very heavily in the scale. The First
Amendment gives binding force to this principle of political
wisdom."8 4
1. The Requirement of State Action
The first amendment limits Congress from making laws
that infringe upon freedom of speech and press.8 5 The first
amendment was made applicable to the various American
states by the incorporation provision of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.8 6 Thus, the protection
of speech and press under the first amendment is predicated
upon state action. If there is no state action, there is no first
80 See STORY, supra note 5, at 731-32.
81 The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 made it a crime to publish any writing
that "defamed or traduced" the Congress, President, or member of the federal judi-
ciary. See Hugh Stevens, Essay, Responsibility in the Media, 9 U. OF FLA. J. OF L.
& PUB. POL. 177, 182 (1998).
82 The constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts was never challenged
in the United States Supreme Court. The Acts, by their own terms, expired in
1801.
83 See Gerald Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court:
The Case of Justice Powel, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1972).
84 See CHAFFEE, supra note 72, at 31.
85 "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . ." U.S. CONST., amend. I (emphasis added).
86 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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amendment protection.8 7 So what is meant by state action? It
is when the government, state or federal attempts to take away
or restrict a constitutional right, such as first amendment
rights, through legislation.88 Furthermore, "[cionduct that is
formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental
policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to
become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon
state action."8 9 Thus, if the government delegates some of its
duties to private parties, the actions of those parties may consti-
tute state action.
There is no authority for the proposition that acts by for-
eign governments constitute state action for purposes of the
first amendment. But the fact that actions by foreign govern-
ments may not constitute state action under a first amendment
analysis does not end the inquiry. What about the situation
where one tries to enforce a foreign judgment or arbitration
award in the United States? Would judicial enforcement of a
foreign judgment or arbitration award by a court in the United
States constitute state action, bring the first amendment into
force? Judicial enforcement of private matters may rise to the
level of state action as in the case of Shelly v. Kramer,90 where it
was held that the lower court's enforcement of a racially restric-
tive covenant contained in the title of real property was state
action for constitutional purposes. However, deeming judicial
enforcement "state action" has not been expanded beyond the
scope of the facts and circumstances set forth in Shelly v.
Kramer. Indeed, in the case of United Egg Producers v. Stan-
dard Brands, Inc.91 the enforcement of a stipulated settlement
whereby one party agreed to refrain from making certain state-
ments was not sufficient state action to bring the first amend-
ment into play. The court held:
"[iWhere a court acts to enforce the right of a private party
which is permitted but not compelled by law, there is no state ac-
87 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); Hudgens v. N.L.R.B.,
424 U.S. 507 (1976); Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Com-
mittee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
88 See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513.
89 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
90 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Q, i i F.2_ 9,n (11th Cir. 1995).
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tion for constitutional purposes in the absence of a finding that
constitutionally impermissible discrimination is involved."92
Thus, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign copyright
judgment or arbitration award may not amount to state action
if the underlying action involves the right of a private party
which is permitted but not compelled by law and the issue of
discrimination is not involved.
2. The First Amendment and Copyright Law
As stated above, United States copyright law creates a
property right.93 Although the fundamental goal of United
States copyright law, to promote the dissemination of creative
works, is rooted in the first amendment, 94 it has been recog-
nized that there is some tension between copyright law and the
first amendment. 95 To the extent that copyright law encour-
ages the dissemination of creative works, it is in harmony with
first amendment objectives. 96 However, there are certain lim-
ited situations where copyright law and the first amendment
come into conflict. These situations may arise when the owner
of a copyrighted work attempts to prevent dissemination
through an infringement action. A successful infringement ac-
tion not only prevents the defendant in such action from speak-
ing, but it also may infringe upon the equally important first
amendment guarantee of the community's right to hear. 97
When this tension arises, a balance needs to be struck be-
tween the property rights created by copyright law and the con-
stitutional interests of free speech and press.98 To the extent
92 United Egg Producers, 44 F.3d at 943.
93 See Fisher, supra note 11, at 1662.
94 See Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Stan-
dards and First Amendment Values, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1289 (1990-91); Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); Twentieth Cen-
tury Music Corp. v. Aikin, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
95 See Denicola, supra note 17, at 285; Crowley, supra note 38, at 437-38; Ste-
phen S. Zimmermann, A Regulatory Theory of Copyright: Avoiding a First Amend-
ment Conflict, 35 EMORY L. J. 163 (1986); Hamel, supra note 11, at 253-55;
Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1180-82; Hartnett, supra note 13, at 167.
96 See Denicola, supra note 17, at 285-86; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943).
97 See Crowley, supra note 38, at 439-42.
98 See Denicola, supra note 17, at 287 and Goldstein, supra note 38, at 991.
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that the property rights of copyright law and the constitutional
interests of free speech and press may not be reconciled, the
property rights of copyright law must yield to the constitutional
interests of free speech and press.9 9 This is so because the
United States Congress may act only within the limits of the
enumerated powers specified within the United States Consti-
tution.100 While the Constitution does grant Congress the
power to make laws regarding copyright, 10 1 this power is tem-
pered by the first amendment. 10 2 So to the extent that the copy-
right law imposed by Congress violates first amendment
interests, the first amendment, which imposes limits upon Con-
gress, will nullify those actions.
Although courts in the United States have recognized that
there are first amendment concerns regarding copyright, to
date, they have asserted that these concerns are adequately ad-
dressed by exceptions to copyright protection, such as the idea/
expression-fact/expression dichotomy and the fair use
doctrine. 103
D. Free Speech and Press in The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the constitutional rights of freedom
of speech and press are not premised upon a "written" constitu-
tion. The British Constitution is an "unwritten" constitution
with its provisions being derived from many sources. 104 Unlike
99 See Denicola, supra note 17, at 288, 303; Hartnett, supra note 13, at 174;
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Paulson v. Per-
sonality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc.2d 444 (1969); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
579 F.2d 215 (2nd Cir. 1978). In this regard, it is important to note that the fair
use exception to copyright is imposed by Congress while first amendment guaran-
tees are imposed on Congress. See Samuelson, supra note 34, at 912.
100 See Reid, 354 US 1 (1957); Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1182; JAMEs MADISON,
THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (1788).
101 U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
102 U.S. CONST., amend. I.
103 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562, 577 n. 13; United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp.
1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974); New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873
F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspa-
pers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980); Wainwright Sec. v. Wall St. Tran-
script Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977); Consumers Union of the United States,
Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2nd Cir. 1983). Additional pro-
tection is provided by the refusal to provide copyright protection for facts. See
Oaks, supra note 30, at 138.
104 See 0. HOOD PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 22-26
(i978).
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the United States Constitution, the various provisions of the
British Constitution can be altered legislatively by the Queen in
Parliament as the legislature is supreme over the constitu-
tion.10 5 Furthermore, courts in the United Kingdom have no
power to review Parliamentary legislation and declare it
unconstitutional. 106
With regard to free press, it has been said:
"The liberty of the press is essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraint upon publi-
cations, and not in freedom from censure for the criminal matter
when published."10 7
Thus, one is free to print whatever he or she desires, but must
suffer the consequences if the subject matter violates the law as
set down by Parliament.
1. Free Speech and Press and Copyright Law in The
United Kingdom
There is a dearth of authority from the United Kingdom re-
garding the application of free speech and press rights to copy-
right cases. While there does not appear to be any commentary
on the application of the idea/expression-fact/expression dichot-
omy and little on the doctrine of fair dealing to protect free
speech and press rights, 0 8 copyright law in the United King-
dom allows the denial of copyright protection on the grounds of
public policy.10 9 Unfortunately, this can be double-edged sword,
while one may argue that public policy requires the denial of
copyright protection in order to allow, the dissemination of in-
formation, it may also be argued that public policy requires the
denial of copyright protection in order to suppress information.
This is what the court did in the Spycatcher cases on the
105 See id. at 26.
106 See id.-
107 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw, 814 (1941). See also JOSEPH R.
FISHER AND JAMES A. STRAHAN, THE LAW OF THE PRESS (1990).
108 By analogy to defamation cases, some United Kingdom cases do apply the
fair dealing doctrine in refusing to grant interlocutory injunctions in copyright
cases. See MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT, supra, note 55, at 135 (citing Fraser v.
Evans, [1969] 1 Q.B. 349); Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] 2 Q.B. 84.
109 See Copyright Act, supra note 54, at § 171(3). See also LADDIE, supra note
55, at 130; DAVIES, supra note 68, at 40-41; Hubbard v. Vosper, [19721 2 W.L.R.
394.
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grounds that the author owed a duty of confidence to the
Crown.110
IV. CASE COMPARISON BETWEEN UNITED STATES
AND UNITED KINGDOM COPYRIGHT LAW
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the differences between
United States copyright law and United Kingdom copyright law
is to examine their applications under case law. For this exer-
cise, we shall use the example of the computer copyright cases
of Computer Assoc. v. Altai1 1 compared with Ibcos Computers
Ltd v. Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd.112 to exem-
plify the differences in the application of the idea/expression di-
chotomy and the compilation copyright cases of Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. 1 13  compared with
Waterlow Directories Limited v. Reed Information Services Lim-
ited 114 to exemplify the differences in the application of the fact]
expression dichotomy.
A. Computer Assoc. v. Altai
The Computer Assoc. case illustrates the trend for courts in
the United States to broadly interpret non-protected ideas. In
that case, defendant hired a former employee of plaintiff to cre-
ate a program that directly competed with plaintiffs pro-
gram.1 5 Defendant realized that its program infringed on
plaintiffs program after it was created. 116 Therefore, defendant
created a second program through the use of a "clean room."
Specifically, defendant assigned its programmers to a room in
which they would work without having access to plaintiffs pro-
gram codes.117 Plaintiff asserted that this second program still
110 See comments of Lord Jauncey in Attorney General v. Guardian Newspa-
pers; Attorney General v. Observer (No. 2), [19901 A.C. 109, 293. See also Denis de
Freitas, Letter From the United Kingdom, 26 COPYRIGHT 31, 48 (1990).
111 982 F.2d 693 (2nd cir. 1992).
112 [1994] F.S.R. 275.
113 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
114 [19921 F.S.R. 409.
115 Computer Assoc., 982 F.2d at 699.
116 See id. at 700.
117 Soo ;d.
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infringed by copying the non-literal aspects, that is the struc-
ture, sequence and operation of its program.11
To determine if defendant impermissibly copied expression
as opposed to ideas, the court applied an abstraction test
whereby the computer program was broken down to its various
constituent layers such as code, sub-modular, modular, sub-
component and component designs. 119 At the various levels, the
court filtered out the "ideas" and other non-protected parts.
What was left after the court filtered out the non-protected
parts was the "core of protectable material."120
In describing this abstraction test, the court referred to
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.121 where Judge Learned
Hand decried the difficulties in discerning what was an idea
and what was expression. 122 The abstraction test is one method
utilized by courts in the United States to deal with this difficult
task. After applying the abstraction test, the court in Computer
Assoc. found very little protectable expression. 123
B. Ibcos Computer Ltd v. Barclays
Ibcos also involved a competing program created by a for-
mer employee of plaintiffs. 124 However, in this case the former
employee was the creator of both programs and no clean room
was involved. As such, more literal elements of copying, such as
spelling mistakes in the code, were evident. This case is inter-
esting in that it compares copyright law of the United Kingdom
with copyright law of the United States. 125
First, the court set forth the pertinent language of the 1988
Act to emphasize the point that any test to be applied in an
infringement action in the United Kingdom must look to the
118 See id.
119 See Computer Assoc., 982 F.2d at 706. See also Gary M. Rinck, The Matur-
ing U.S. Law on Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Computer Associ-
ates v. Altai and Other Recent Case Developments, 14 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL
PROP. REV. 351, 353 (1992).
120 See Computer Assoc., 982 F.2d at 707.
121 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
122 See Computer Assoc. 982 F.2d at 704.
123 See id. at 721.
124 See Ibcos, [19941 F.S.R. at 282-283.
125 See Laurence Jacobs, Demystifying Copyright Infringement of Computer
Software, 16 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. REV. 206 (1994) for a detailed com-
parison of Ibcos and Computer Assoc.
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statute and avoid such statements like "there is no copyright in
an idea." This is so given that the 1988 Act does not prohibit
copyright protection of ideas.126 The statutory test, according to
the court, involves asking the following questions:
1. What is the work or works in which the plaintiff claims
copyright?
2. Is such work "original?"
3. Was there copying from that work?
4. If there was copying, has a substantial part of that work
been reproduced? 12
7
It was under the second prong of this test, in trying to de-
termine originality, that the court discussed the idea/expression
dichotomy. There, the court stated:
The true position is that where an 'idea' is sufficiently gen-
eral, then even if an original work embodies it, the mere taking of
that idea will not infringe. But if the 'idea' is detailed, then there
may be infringement. It is a question of degree. 128
With respect to the application of United States copyright
cases, the court noted:
The fact is that United States copyright law is not the same
as ours, particularly in the area of copyright works concerned
with functionality and compilations. The Americans (many would
say sensibly) never developed copyright so that functional things
like exhaust pipes could not be copied. This is partly due to their
statute, which is different from our Act. 129
Although the court did emphasize the differences between
United Kingdom copyright law and United States copyright
law, it is doubtful that a court in the United States faced with
similar facts would have ruled differently.
C. Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service 130
In Feist, plaintiff sued defendant for copyright infringe-
ment stemming from defendant's incorporating information
126 See Ibcos, [1992] F.S.R. at 289.
127 See id. at 290.
128 Id at 291.
129 Id. at 292.
130 AGO TT. An (IQ.Q1)
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from plaintiffs telephone directory into its own telephone direc-
tory. 131 There was no dispute that defendant did copy some of
the information contained in plaintiffs telephone directory. 132
Nor was there any dispute that defendant's telephone directory
directly competed for advertisement fees with plaintiffs tele-
phone directory. 133 The United States Supreme Court identi-
fied the issue in Feist as the interaction between the well-
established principle that facts are not copyrightable but that
compilations of facts may be copyrightable.' 34 The Court ulti-
mately held that there was no protection.' 35
The Court focused its attention on the originality require-
ment of United States copyright law136 stating that this is a
constitutional requirement. 37 The term "originality" is not to
be found in article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States
Constitution. This pronouncement by the Court is derived from
case law defining the term "author" as an originator. 138 Be-
cause facts are not "original," one cannot claim protection of
facts. However, factual compilations may possess a "modicum"
of originality allowing some protection. This originality may be
in the selection, coordination or arrangement in which the facts
are organized for presentation to the reader. 3 9 Not every selec-
tion, coordination or arrangement will necessarily be original.
For example, there may be only a limited number of ways that
facts may be organized to be of any use. Because of this neces-
sity in arrangement, there may not be the minimal level of crea-
tivity required for originality.
The Court noted that copyright protection for factual com-
pilations was necessarily thin.140 This was due to constitu-
tional constraints as the pertinent parts of United States
Constitution have as their main goal the dissemination of infor-
mation, not the protection of the labor of authors. Thus, the
131 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 343.
132 See id. at 344.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See id. at 362.
136 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103.
137 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 351.
138 See id.
139 See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
140 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358.
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Court specifically rejected the "sweat of the brow" theory, 141
which some lower courts in the United States had applied. 142
There was no dispute that the material copied was factual.
The main question was whether the facts were compiled in such
a fashion as to meet the originality requirement. The Court
unanimously agreed that the originality requirement was not
met.' 43 The end product produced by plaintiff was a "garden-
variety" telephone directory with the names listed in alphabeti-
cal order. 144
D. Waterlow Directories v. Reed Information 145
In Waterlow, the court was considering a restraining order
sought by plaintiff and, thus, had to decide if plaintiff was likely
to prevail at trial. 46 Waterlow involved facts similar to Feist in
that the defendant copied information from plaintiffs directory
to compile its own directory. The directory was one of solicitors
and barristers as opposed to a general telephone book.147 Still,
the information taken-names, addresses and telephone num-
bers-was similar.
The court focused upon whether a substantial portion was
taken (a fact conceded in Feist), and whether the fact that de-
fendant could have obtained the information from other sources
obviated the alleged infringement.1 48 The court held that a sub-
stantial portion was taken and the fact that defendant could
have obtained the information from other sources did not
change the fact that defendant had copied plaintiffs direc-
tory.149 Finding that plaintiff was likely to prevail in its in-
fringement action, the restraining order was granted. 50
The court did not discuss whether facts were part of the
information copied nor did it state that facts were not copyright-
141 "Sweat of the Brow" theory is the underlying notion that copyright was a
reward for the hard work that went into compiling facts. Id. at 352.
142 See id. 359.
143 See id. at 361.
144 See id. at 367.
145 See [19921 F.S.R. 409.
146 See Waterlow, [1992] F.S.R. at 411.
147 See id.
148 See id. at 411-12.
149 See id. at 413.
150 See id. at 417.
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able. Further, the court did not require any creativity or origi-
nality in a compilation. The court did state that a "sweat of the
brow" theory was the law in the United Kingdom and cited the
case of Morris v. Ashbee, 151 to wit:
[N]o one has a right to take the results of the labour and ex-
pense incurred by another for the purpose of a rival publication,
and thereby save himself the expense and labour of working out
and arriving at these results by some independent road. 152
E. Summary
It is apparent that there are some fundamental differences
between United States and United Kingdom copyright law.
This point is made clear by the court in Ibcos and can be de-
duced from the comparison of Computer Assoc. with Ibcos,
which establishes that:
1. United States copyright law does not distinguish between
"general ideas" and "specific ideas" whereas United Kingdom
copyright law does; and
2. The United States idea/expression dichotomy is based
upon constitutional constraints and statutory language but it is
not afforded such authority in the United Kingdom and, thus,
may be given less weight by courts in the United Kingdom.153
The comparison between Feist and Waterlow is even more
interesting as it shows inconsistent results due to the funda-
mental differences in the laws. For example:
1. Feist points out the fact/expression dichotomy, which is
not apparerit in Waterlow;
2. Feist expressly rejects the "sweat of the brow" theory,
which was expressly accepted by the court in Waterlow; and
3. The Court in Feist severely limited the protection to compi-
lations by focusing on the constitutional and statutory require-
ment of originality, while the court in Waterlow focused on
whether a substantial portion was taken. The court did not pro-
151 [1868] L.R. 7 Eq. 34.
152 Morris, [1868] L.R. 7 Eq. 34, Sir George Giffard V.C., at 40.
153 For a more detailed discussion on the differences between the United States
and the United Kingdom in the application of the idea/expression dichotomy, see
Steven Ang, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and Merger Doctrine in the Copyright
Laws of the U.S. and the U.K., 2 INT'L J. L. AND INFORMATION & TECHNOLOGY 111.
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vide an analysis of the "original" language set forth in section 1 of
the 1988 Act, nor did it discuss the definition of "author" as a crea-
tor in section 9 of the 1988 Act.
Because both Computer Assoc. and Ibcos reached a similar
result, albeit by a different road, the differences in the law are
not as glaring. However, as the court in Ibcos points out, there
are differences and they are of a fundamental nature.154 These
differences are more evident in comparing compilation cases,
such as Feist and Waterlow, as these cases reached entirely dif-
ferent conclusions. 155
V. THE LIBEL LAW ANALOGY
Thus far, we have examined copyright law and freedom of
speech and press in the United States and the United Kingdom
illustrating that there are fundamental differences in these
laws. In the United States, the Constitution limits Congress'
power to provide copyright protection when protection would
mean an unacceptable compromise of first amendment free
speech and press rights. In the United Kingdom, Parliament is
supreme and there are fewer limits on copyright protection.
But, as a practical matter, do these differences have any fore-
seeable consequences? To date, there are no cases or commen-
tary raising any practical concerns stemming from these
differences. However, in other areas of law, such as libel law,
differences between United States law and United Kingdom law
has had alarming consequences.15 6 This is significant because
United States libel law, like United States copyright law, has
first amendment implications.
A. The First Amendment in Libel and Copyright Cases
The analogy between libel defendants asserting claims of
constitutional privileges based upon the first amendment and
defendants in copyright infringement suits asserting claims of
constitutional privileges based upon the first amendment has
154 See Ibcos, [1992] F.S.R. at 292.
155 Clive D. Thorne, Infringement of Database Compilations: A Case for Re-
form, 13 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. REV. 331 (1991).
156 See, e.g., Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995); Bachchan
v. Abroad Publications, Inc. 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992); Abdullah v. Sheridan Press,
.-r-c.,=A n n 015 (.3fNV. 1994).
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not gone unnoticed by legal commentators. 157 Public policy in-
terests have been considered by courts in both libel l58 and copy-
right cases.1 59 While a separate and distinct first amendment
defense in copyright cases has not been successfully upheld by
courts in the United States, it is clear that first amendment con-
cerns permeate the reasoning behind the idea/expression-factl
expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.
As we have already observed, free speech and press are not
absolute in democratic societies. 60 A classic example of re-
stricting unfettered free speech and press is evident in the vari-
ous libel laws which restrict free speech and press to some
extent in favor of other social policies, such as ones right to his
or her reputation and privacy interests.' 6 ' In the United
States, libel laws are enforceable provided they meet the consti-
tutional requirements set down by the United States Supreme
Court decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan162 and its
progeny. In the United Kingdom, libel laws are routinely in-
voked to restrict speech that damages one's reputation. 163
Although there are some similarities between United
States libel laws and United Kingdom libel laws, courts in the
United States have held that the differences between these laws
raise first amendment concerns when one tries to enforce an
English libel judgment in the United States. 164 An examination
of this case law illustrates these differences, including: the fail-
ure of the courts in the United States to apply a proper state
action analysis and the possibility of applying the reasoning of
these cases to foreign copyright judgments and arbitration
157 See Trunko, supra note 16, at 1940; Denicola, supra note 17, at 283; Gold-
stein, supra note 38, at 983; Oakes, supra note 30, at 135; Hartnett, supra note 13,
at 183, n. 75.
158 See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 569 (1975).
159 See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1966); Trunko, supra note 16, at 1964.
160 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
161 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 45.
162 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
163 See KENNETH MCK NORRIE, DEFAMATION AND RELATED ACTIONS IN SCOTS
LAw 1 (1995); P.F. CARTER-RUCK AND R. WALKER, CARTER-RUCK ON LIBEL AND
SLANDER, 30-53 (3rd ed. 1985).
164 See, e.g., Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995); Bachchan
v. Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992); Abdullah v. Sheridan Press,
Inc., 154 F.R.D. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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awards in subsequent recognition and enforcement actions in
the United States.
B. The English Libel Judgment Cases
In Matusevitch v. Telnikoff,165 Telnikoff, a Russian emigre
employed by the B.B.C. Russian service, wrote an article that
was published in a British newspaper. 166 Matusevitch, also a
Russian emigre, was employed by Radio Liberty in London, a
United States owned radio station. Matusevitch wrote a letter
in response to Telnikoffs article, which was published in a Brit-
ish newspaper. 167 Telnikoff sued Matusevitch in England alleg-
ing that Matusevitch's letter was defamatory and prevailed. 168
Thereafter, Telnikoff sought to have his English libel judgment
recognized and enforced in the United States.
The court in the United States ruled that Telnikoff s judg-
ment could not be recognized and enforced in the United States
on the grounds that English law on libel differs from United
States law and is repugnant to first and fourteenth amendment
rights.169 The court held that public policy considerations, i.e.
preservation of first and fourteenth amendment rights, were
sufficient to decline recognition. 170 Because the defamation
laws of England do not afford a defamation defendant the same
free speech and press protection afforded under United States
law, the Court ruled that the first amendment prevented the
judgment from being recognized and enforced in the United
States.' 7 1
The main problem with the court's analysis in Matusevitch
is that there is no discussion regarding state action nor any con-
tact with the United States which might justify the application
of the first amendment. 72 There is no indication that any of
165 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995).
166 These preliminary facts are not discussed in the American case. They are
set forth in the British case of Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, [1992] 2 A.C. 343.
167 See Telnikoff, [1992] 2 A.C. at 343.
168 See id.
169 See Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 4.
170 See id.
171 See id. at 6.
172 The court referred to the case of Abdullah v. Sheridan Press, Inc., 154
F.R.D. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) as illustrative of a court's decision to deny recognition
of a foreign libel judgement on public policy grounds based upon the first amend-
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the parties were United States citizens, that the defamatory
statement was made in the United States or published in the
United States. One wonders why the court applied the first
amendment in such an extraterritorial fashion. 173
In Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc., ' 7 4 plaintiff,
an Indian national, sued defendant, a New York based operator
of a news service, in England for libel stemming from a story
written by a reporter in London and published in the United
Kingdom. 175 The English court entered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff. 76 Plaintiff sought to have the judgment recog-
nized in the United States. The court in New York ruled that
the judgment could not be recognized because the alleged de-
famatory statements were matters of public concern and, hence,
the first amendment was applicable. 77 The court found that
English libel law, unlike United States libel law, placed the bur-
den of proof on the defendant and did not require a finding of
fault. 178 Thus, it was repugnant to the first amendment. 79
Once again, the court did not discuss state action or any
contacts with the United States, which would justify the appli-
cation of the first amendment. In Bachchan, the defendant was
a New York based news service, so the court may have believed
that this contact was sufficient to apply the first amendment.
However, the lex loci delicti was in England as it was only the
publication in England that was at issue. It is difficult to see
how recognition of the English judgment would affect free
speech in the United States, which should be the focus of the
court's concern.18 0
ment. Unfortunately, the Abdullah case does nothing to assist our analysis as it
does not discuss state action, U.S. contacts nor lex loci delicti issues.
173 For an analysis on the extent of any extraterritorial application of the
United States Constitution, see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990).
174 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992).
175 See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661. The article also was published in New
York but plaintiffs action was limited to the damages arising from the publication
in England. See Derek Devgun, United States Enforcement of English Defamation
Judgements: Exporting the First Amendment?, 23 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 195, 202
(1994).
176 See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
177 See id. at 664.
178 See id. at 663.
179 See id. at 665.
180 Devgun, supra note 175, at 203.
[Vol. 10:361
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/1
1998] FIRST AMENDMENT AND FOREIGN COPYRIGHT 391
C. Applying the Libel Law Analogy to Copyright Cases
The libel law analogy gives rise to a very interesting prob-
lem in resolving international copyright disputes. Given these
decisions by courts in the United States, refusing to recognize
and enforce English defamation judgments, could the same rea-
soning be used by courts in the United States to refuse to recog-
nize and enforce a foreign copyright judgment or arbitration
award? 181
If we are to accept as United States law what the courts
have stated in Matusevitch and Bachchan, then one could argue
that the law requires that courts in the United States consider-
ing recognition and enforcement of foreign copyright judgments
and arbitration awards examine free speech and press protec-
tion afforded under the substantive law applied as they have in
libel cases.
Obtaining an arbitration award, as opposed to a judgment,
does not solve this problem. While copyright issues are arbitra-
ble in the United States 8 2 and in the United Kingdom, 18 3 a
court in the United States ruling on the recognition and en-
forcement of an arbitration award from the United Kingdom,
applying United Kingdom copyright law, would refer to the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention")18 4 as both
the United States and the United Kingdom are signatories.
While the New York Convention does provide an effective inter-
national framework for recognizing and enforcing international
arbitration awards, arbitration does not provide the panacea for
recognition and enforcement problems. Article V (2)(b) of the
New York Convention allows a court to refuse to recognize and
enforce the arbitration award if it would be contrary to the pub-
181 The possibility of extending the rule of no enforcement in these defamation
cases to other causes of action was suggested by Devgun, supra note 175, at 211-
13.
182 See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191
(7th Cir. 1987); Laurie Seigel Kaplan, Arbitration and Intellectual Property: A Sur-
vey in Patent, Trademark and Copyright Cases, 18 INTELLECTUAL PRoP. L. REV.
439 (1986).
183 See ETRI Fans Limited v. NMB UK Limited, [1987] F.S.R. 389; London &
Leeds Estates Ltd. v. Paribas Ltd. No.2, [1995] 02 E.G. 134, [1995] 1 E.G.L.R. 102.
184 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6.997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
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lic policy of that country.18 5 While this provision is not often
invoked by courts in the United States, it must be remembered
that the Matusevitch and Bachchan cases were decided upon
public policy considerations. Indeed, to recognize and enforce
such awards would violate the first amendment and hence the
public policy of the United States.
Another related problem comes to mind, and that is the
arbitrability of United States constitutional issues. Even
though the courts in the United States seem to be ready to ac-
cept the arbitrability of almost any legal issue between private
parties,18 6 they have not, to date, recognized the arbitrability of
constitutional issues. Congress does have the power to regulate
foreign commerce by implementing the Federal Arbitration
Act 87 and federal policy in the United States does favor arbi-
tration, 8 8 especially in international business transactions.18 9
However, once again the Constitution of the United States is
the supreme law of the land and it is up to the courts, not Con-
gress, to rule upon the arbitrability of constitutional issues.
A first amendment examination by courts in the United
States considering recognition and enforcement of foreign copy-
right judgments and arbitration awards may have an effect un-
anticipated by United States policy-makers in their eagerness
to provide international protection for United States copyright
owners. The refusal to recognize and enforce a foreign copy-
right judgment or arbitration award would undermine the pur-
pose behind most international agreements in this field of law
and may have significant political repercussions. To illustrate
these unanticipated effects, it is necessary for us to examine
United States incentives for supporting international copyright
conventions, treaties and accords and to examine some of the
185 See id. art. V (2)(b).
186 Joseph D. Becker and Joosje M. Kleyn, Public Policy and Arbitration-The
'Unruly Horse' and the Arbitrability of Claims in America, 17 INT'L Bus. LAWYER
422 (1989).
187 9 U.S.C. 1, et seq.; Seymour v. Gloria Jean's Coffee Bean Franchising Corp.,
732 F. Supp. 988 (D.Minn. 1990).
188 See Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
189 See National Titanium Dioxide Co., Ltd. v. Velco Enterprises, Ltd., 879 F.
Supp. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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more prominent international agreements regarding copyright
protection such as Berne' 90 and GATT191/TRIPS.192
VI. THE UNITED STATES INCENTIVES FOR SUPPORTING
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTIONS, TREATIES
AND ACCORDS
It is not difficult to discern the United States' incentives for
supporting international copyright conventions, treaties and ac-
cords. In 1988 alone it was estimated that there was between
$14 billion 93 and $23.8 billion' 94 in international infringement
losses and billions of dollars in trade surplusage attributed to
the copyright industries.195 Thus, many would argue that it
would have been irresponsible not to support international
copyright protection. What is surprising is the apparent lack of
attention paid by United States policy-makers to the possible
constitutional problems that could undermine the purpose be-
hind these international copyright conventions, treaties and ac-
cords. 196  Given the supremacy of the United States
Constitution over enactments of Congress, including interna-
tional treaties, conventions and accords, 97 one would think
that it would be imperative for United States policy-makers to
190 See Berne, supra note 1.
191 See GATT, supra note 2.
192 See TRIPS, supra note 3.
193 See Al J. Daniel, Jr., Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round: The
Dunkel Draft and a Comparison of United States Intellectual Property Rights,
Remedies, and Border Measures, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 751, 752-64 (1992).
194 See Gabriel E Larrea Richerand, GATT, Intellectual Property Rights and
the Developing Countries, 25(3) COPYRIGHT BULLETIN 4.
195 See Carol Motyka, U.S. Participation in the Berne Convention and High
Technology, 39 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 107, 118 (1992)($13 billion in 1988).
196 See NIMMER, supra note 15, at § 18.06 (c)(3)(a)(b), 18-81 to 18-84. See also
Olivia Regnier, Who Framed Article 18? The Protection of Pre-1989 Works in the
U.S.A. Under the Berne Convention, 15 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. REV. 400,
402 (1993); Katherine S. Deters, Retroactivity and Reliance Rights Under Article
18 of the Berne Copyright Convention, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 971 (1991). The
Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Conven-
tion, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513 (1985-86), states that there may be a first
amendment problem with the retroactivity provision in article 18 of Berne (Id. at
587-591), but devotes little attention to a viable solution to the problem and ig-
nores other constitutional implications.
197 See 2 RENE DAVID, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw, ch.
3 at 40-41 (The Hague 1984); U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 253-54 (1972).
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consider constitutional implications. Yet, it seems that in push-
ing forward in the international field of copyright law, United
States policy-makers have pushed back the Constitution.
As a practical matter, the fact that United States policy-
makers have paid little heed to the constitutional constraints
upon copyright law matters little if the international treaties,
conventions, and accords do not in fact create a problem where
the United States cannot provide redress for foreign copyright
owners due to constitutional impediments. In this regard, we
must keep in mind the fact that United States copyright law
has been held to have no extraterritorial effect. 198 So our analy-
sis is not concerned with the application of United States copy-
right law abroad; rather it is concerned with the application of
international and foreign copyright law in recognition and en-
forcement actions in the United States.
A. A Review of the Berne Convention
The Berne Convention was first signed in 1886.199 The im-
petus behind Berne was the authors' and publishers' associa-
tions of France and Germany who desired to implement formal
international protection for copyrights. 200 This avowed purpose
is stated in the preamble of Berne, to wit "to protect, in as effec-
tive and uniform a manner as possible, the rights of authors in
their literary and artistic works." 201 Immediately, our problem
is apparent: How effectively can the rights of authors be pro-
tected if they cannot enforce their foreign copyright judgments
or arbitration awards?
Berne has been revised several times: Paris in 1886, Berlin
in 1908, Rome in 1928, Brussels in 1948, Stockholm in 1967 and
198 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Affirmation of Territorial Limits of U.S. Copy-
right Protection: Two Recent Decisions, 14 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. REV.
136, 138 (1992); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Subafilms,
Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994); NIMMER,
supra note 15, at § 17.02.
199 See VINCENT PORTER, BEYOND THE BERNE CONVENTION-COPYRIGHT,
BROADCASTING AND THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 2 (1991). The original signato-
ries to Berne included Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Tu-
nis and Haiti. See id. at 2.
200 See id. at 2.
201 Berne, supra note 1 (the Berne Preamble, Paris 1971 is the same as the
original version, circa 1886).
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Paris in 1971.202 The main purpose behind each of these revi-
sions was the desire to update Berne to provide additional pro-
tection to authors in response to new technology. For example,
the Berlin revision of 1908 was to address the new technologies
of photography, sound recording and cinematography; 20 3 the
Rome revision of 1928 was to address radio broadcasting
rights;20 4 the Brussels revision of 1948 was to address difficul-
ties arising with regard to the recording and film industries, as
well as the new television industry;20 5 and the Stockholm revi-
sion of 1967 together with the Paris revision of 1971 modified
Berne to further accommodate new technologies. 20 6 Because
there are five effective revisions, it is important to determine
which version a country has executed. For example, a country
which has executed the 1948 Brussels Act but not the 1971
Paris Act, will only be bound by Berne pursuant to the Brussels
Act (1948). The United Kingdom and the United States are
bound by the Paris Act (1971).2 0 7
Article 36 of Berne requires a country wishing to become a
member to reform its copyright laws to be compatible with
Berne. 208 For example, when the United States became a mem-
ber of Berne it had to revise its copyright law to remove formal
notice and registration requirements, remove its requirement
that works be published in the United States to receive protec-
tion in the United States, add protection of moral rights and
202 See PORTER, supra note 199, at 2.
203 See id. at 4.
204 See id. at 5.
205 See id. at 7-9.
206 See id. at 10. The Stockholm revision of 1967 never came into effect due to
insufficient ratification. However, some of its revisions were adopted by the Paris
revision of 1971, which is currently in effect. See Porter, supra note 199, at 10.
207 See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION ("WIPO") General Infor-
mation, 51 (Geneva 1996). The United States implemented the Paris Act (1971) on
March 1, 1989 when the United States first became a member of Berne. See id.
208 .qo Rprnp, .wznrn note 1. at art. 36.
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architecture, revise the term of protection 20 9 and allow for the
retroactive application of protection. 210
If a work is specifically protected by Berne, it is protected
by a member country even if it is not protected under the mem-
ber country's domestic laws.211 The list of works specifically
protected by Berne can be found in article 2(1).212 For example,
if a member country's domestic law does not protect lithogra-
phy, protection will be afforded to lithography under the terms
of Berne as it is a work specifically protected under article 2(1).
There is no formal enforcement mechanism for a violation of
Berne. 213 However, a member country may bring an action
against another member country at the International Court of
Justice.214
Article 18 of Berne requires retroactive application of pro-
tection to all works that have not fallen into the public domain
through the expiry of the term of protection.215 Thus, if a work
in the United States has fallen into the public domain due to
failure to comply with the notice requirements under the pre-
1989 United States copyright law, it would receive protection
under Berne.
The protection afforded under Berne is national treatment
of foreign authors. 216 This means that a foreign author from
member state A will be afforded protection in member state B to
the same extent that national authors in member state B are
afforded protection.
209 See Motyka, supra note 195, at 114-15; Ralph Oman, Letter From the
United States of America, 27 COPYRIGHT 117 (1991). In general, the term of protec-
tion under Berne is the author's life plus 50 years. See also Sam Ricketson, Dura-
tion of Term of Protection Under the Berne Convention, 27 COPYRIGHT 84 (1991);
Berne, supra note 1, at art. 7.
210 Initially, the United States did not revise its law regarding retroactive ap-
plication of protection as required by article 18 of Berne. See Regnier, supra note
196, at 402. This was corrected in 1994 by the TRIPS Amendment. See NIMMER,
supra note 15, at §§ 9A.01 and 18.06 (c)(1).
211 See Motyka, supra note 195, at 129-30.
212 See Berne, supra note 1, at art. (2)(1).
213 See Motyko, supra note 195.
214 See Berne, supra note 1, art. 33.
215 See Berne, supra note 1, at art. 18.
216 See Gyorgy Boytha, Some Private International Law Aspects of the Protec-
tion of Authors' Rights, 24 COPYRIGHT 399, 400 (1988) and WIPO, supra note 207,
at 52.
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There is some debate amongst commentators over the ap-
plicable substantive law in an action for infringement under
Berne. Some argue that the law of the place of protection, i.e.
the lex loci protectionis, applies. 217 Others argue that the law of
the place of the origin of the work, i.e. the lex loci originis, ap-
plies. 218 To some extent, Berne applies both lex loci protectionis
and lex loci originis within its framework of protection. Under
Berne, an author must have a link to a member country.21 9
These "links," or eligibility factors, are specified in Berne at ar-
ticle 3, to wit:
1. An author who is a national of a member country;
2. An author who is not a national of a member country, but
whose work is first published in a member country or simultane-
ously published in a country that is not a member and in a mem-
ber country; or
3. An author who is not a national of a member country but
who is a habitual resident of a member country.
220
As we can see, the second eligibility factor does apply the
doctrine of lex loci originis. However, it would be a mistake to
view this as the proper law to be applied in an infringement
action. Article 5(1) of Berne clearly provides that the proper
law to be applied is the lex loci protectionis. 221 The eligibility
factors merely determine if Berne is applicable, not what sub-
stantive law is applicable.
Another area under Berne where the lex loci originis may
apply is the term of protection.222 Under Berne, the term of pro-
tection is governed by the law of the place where protection is
claimed but it shall not exceed the term of the country of origin
(lex loci originis) unless the law of the place where protection is
claimed (lex loci protectionis) provides otherwise.223
217 See Berne, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
218 See, e.g., Boytha, supra note 216, arguing that the law of the place of protec-
tion applies as compared to Georges Koumantos, Private International Law and
the Berne Convention, 24 COPYRIGHT 415 (1988) arguing that the law of the place of
origin applies.
219 See Berne, supra note 1, art. 3, secs. 1 & 2.
220 Id.
221 See Boytha, supra note 216, at 407-09.
222 See id. at 411.
223 See Berne, supra note 1, at art. 7(8).
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Although article 5(1) of Berne provides for protection under
the doctrine of lex loci protectionis, 224 it is not entirely clear if
this means that a foreign author is to be protected by the law of
the place where the work was improperly used or the law of the
place of the proceedings (lex fori). The majority view is that it is
the law of the place where the work was improperly used as
opposed to the lex fori. 225
In general, Berne does not apply to protection of works in
the country of origin. Protection in the country of origin is gov-
erned by domestic law.226 However, to the extent that the do-
mestic law of the country of origin does not apply to foreign
authors, Berne requires that the foreign author be given na-
tional treatment.227
To recapitulate, the purpose of Berne is to provide interna-
tional protection, "in as effective and uniform a manner as pos-
sible," of "the rights of authors in their literary and artistic
works."228 When a country becomes a member of Berne, certain
minimum protection requirements must be met. Under Berne,
the mechanism to achieve its goal is to provide national treat-
ment to foreign authors. This means that the lex loci protec-
tionis will be applied regarding acts of infringement and
remedies but lex loci originis will be applied for some eligibility
issues and possibly for the term of protection.
B. A Review of GATTITRIPS
GATT/TRIPS was the first successful attempt to bring in-
tellectual property within the terms of GATT. 229 TRIPS does
not replace Berne. Rather, it supplements Berne by incorporat-
ing Berne's provisions, such as the application of article 18 of
Berne through article 14(6) of TRIPS230 , and adding the en-
forcement incentive of trade sanctions on countries that do not
provide adequate protection. 231
224 See id. at art. 5(1).
225 See Boytha, supra note 216, at 409.
226 See Berne, supra note 1, at art. 5(3).
227 See Boytha, supra note 216, at 409; Koumantos, supra note 218, at 424.
228 Berne, supra note 1, at Preamble.
229 See Daniel, supra note 193, at 752; Regnier, supra note 196, at 405.
230 See Regnier, supra note 196, at 405.
231 See Clive Bradley, The Role of GATT in Intellectual Property, 25(3) Copy.
RIGHT BULLETIN 11, 12 (1991).
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Certainly, from a political perspective, it was advantageous
for the United States to become a member of Berne prior to en-
tering into negotiations for TRIPS. It was rather difficult for
the United States to argue in favor of including intellectual
property in a GATT agreement to protect its interests while it
was not even a signatory to the most influential international
agreement on copyright. 232 And, from an economic perspective,
it is possibly advantageous to have some enforcement mecha-
nism, although it is limited in its usefulness. But the lack of
careful constitutional analysis could pose an embarrassing
problem for the United States if United States courts refuse to
recognize and enforce foreign copyright judgements and arbitra-
tion awards due to first amendment concerns. Such court deci-
sions would undermine the purpose of Berne and GATT/TRIPS
by not providing effective and adequate protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
United States copyright law is expressly based upon the
United States Constitution. 233 While the United States Consti-
tution grants the United States Congress power to enact copy-
right laws, this power is tempered by freedom of speech and
press guaranteed by the first amendment of the United States
Constitution. Unfortunately, United States policy-makers seem
to have neglected to take first amendment mandates into con-
sideration when they pushed forward with their desire to pro-
vide international protection to holders of United States
copyrights.
The problem with this lack of foresight is made apparent
when one recognizes the fact that United States copyright law
is different in some fundamental respects from the copyright
laws of other nations. This article has examined some of these
differences by a comparison with the copyright law of the
United Kingdom, a country with a common legal heritage and
hence many legal similarities. The problems may be even more
egregious if one compares United States copyright law with the
laws of other nations. 234
232 See Motyka, supra, note 195, at 138.
233 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
234 French copyright law, for example, has as its main objective the moral
rights of the author, as opposed to the Anglo-American copyright law, which is
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As a practical matter, one should consider the political and
economic influences at play. Copyright law has become one of
the "darlings" of the international legal community. This is eas-
ily explained by the significant amount of money involved. Per-
haps one of the most telling signals of this political and
economic influence in the United States can be gleaned from the
name-change of the Senate subcommittee with jurisdiction over
copyright from "Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration
of Justice" to "Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administra-
tion of Justice."235 This name-change occurred at approxi-
mately the same time that the United States became a member
of Berne. Although it has been suggested that this name-
change did not reflect a change of focus from the Bill of Rights,
including the first amendment, to intellectual property,23 6 one
cannot help but wonder why the subcommittee felt the need to
change its name if there was not a change of focus.
Under United States law it is the courts and not the United
States policy-makers or Congress who have the last say. And
just how courts in the United States will deal with this issue is
a mystery. Some insight may be obtained, by analogy, from the
libel law field. The libel law analogy establishes that there are
real and practical problems faced by those who possess a foreign
copyright judgment or arbitration award and try to have it rec-
ognized and enforced in the United States. If there are United
States constitutional implications a court may find that the for-
eign law runs afoul of the United States Constitution and refuse
recognition and. enforcement on public policy grounds. Such a
ruling would undermine the purposes of Berne and GATT/
TRIPS and may result in other countries' refusals to recognize
and enforce United States copyright judgments and arbitration
awards.
This article has argued that the first amendment analysis
by the courts in the libel cases of Matusevitch v. Telnikoff237 and
based upon economics. See EDWARD W. PLOMAN AND L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPY-
RIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, 108 & 196 (1980).
235 Robert W. Kastenmeier, The 1989 Horace S. Manges Lecture-'Copyright in
an Era of Technological Change: A Political Perspective', 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 1 (1989).
236 See id.
237 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.C.D.C. 1995).
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Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.238 is flawed and
that recognition and enforcement should have been allowed.
However, to date, these cases are still good law. Therefore, one
attempting to enforce a foreign copyright judgment or arbitra-
tion award in the United States must consider this problem: if
the substantive foreign law of the underlying action raises
United States constitutional concerns the judgment or arbitra-
tion award may not be recognized and enforced in the United
States.
238 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992).
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